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In Greece, the provision of tertiary education is permitted, by the constitution, only to ‘public’ 
institutions where faculty and administrators are civil servants and public officials respectively. 
We construct an argument and present statistical data that describe the situation observed in 
Greece, where the community of higher education providers decides in the name of the whole 
society on the extent to which the provision of these services is a (state) monopoly. We see that in 
the context of our argument the society has to override the decision of the educational community 
regarding the provision of these services if it desires to see the community of educational services 
providers to allocate more time towards their profession and less time towards rent protection 
and/or extraction We argue that once reform, that is the removal of the state monopoly, is 
introduced the educational community will allocate more effort towards educational related 
activities and less effort towards rent protection while at the same time it will accept a new 












In Greece, the provision of tertiary education is permitted, by the constitution, only to ‘public’ 
institutions where faculty and administrators are civil servants and public officials respectively. 
universities are financed almost solely by taxes and students pay no tuition fees. Any reform 
proposals either to transform ‘public’ universities to non-governmental, non-profit institutions or 
even to permit the establishment of new non-governmental institutions of higher learning 
introducing the provision of competing services, are usually met by fierce resistance from almost 
all members of the educational community, that by definition work at the ‘public’ tertiary 
education institutions, and that are at the center stage of the defense of the status quo. Indeed, the 
civil servant status of Professors and, as a consequence, the lack of free competition among them 
as among ‘public’ universities, have been blamed for a significant deterioration of the quality of 
higher education (Psacharopoulos 2004). Although universities’ poor performance is widely 
acknowledged, voices in favor of reforming the existing system by introducing criteria such as 
accountability and efficiency for a more competitive allocation of federal funding usually lead to 
strong opposition by the university Faculties. Their core argument is that any proposed reforms to 
deregulate higher education, aim at serving solely the market and not the public interest or 
academic values. Campaigning continuously against efficiency-enhancing reforms, faculties and 
most of the tenured Professors in particular, being free of constraints that job evaluation entails, 
are able to allocate their time to strengthen the coherence and power of their interest redistribute 
group.  
 
We argue in this paper that when higher education monopoly providers allocate time to organize 
themselves and protect their monopoly rights, that is they engage in rent-protecting activities to 
hold on to monopoly rights, they spend, as a result, less time for purely academic activities, that is 
good teaching and publications in professional journals. In particular, in this paper we describe 
the situation observed in Greece, where the community of tertiary education providers decides in 
the name of the whole society on the extent to which the provision of these services is a (state) 
monopoly. We see that in the context of our model the society has to override the decision of the 
educational community regarding the provision of these services if it desires to see the 
community of educational services providers to allocate more time towards their profession and 
less time towards rent extraction and protection. It also tells us that as long as the educational 
community can extract and protect these rents there will be an equilibrium at which it will 
continue the extraction and protection of these rents in perpetuity and at the same time oppose 
any initiative to introduce reforms that would lead to an end to the state monopoly in tertiary 
education. We argue that once reform, that is the removal of the state monopoly, is introduced the 
educational community that now allocates time to extract and protect the monopoly rents and 
oppose reform, will allocate more effort towards educational related activities and less effort 
towards rent extraction and protection while at the same time it will accept a new equilibrium in 
which education related activities are rewarded more generously.   
 
In section 2, we present and analyze the performance of the Greek higher education. Descriptive 
statistics and data that are available on the spending on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP 
and certain measures of performance show that in Greece measures of quality and quantity are 
low, even when accounting for low spending on education. These are symptoms compatible with 
the existence of a textbook case monopoly that is unproductive and harmful to consumers. At the 
same time it is compatible with a continuing rent extraction to the monopolist, as relevant 
economic theory suggests (Tullock 1993, Tollison 1997, McChesney 2001, Hillman 2003, 




In section 3, we propose in brief policy measures to abolish sτate monopoly in tertiary education, 
overlooking potential objections by the educational community. Policies suggested include the 
provision of incentives to reform and deregulate the system, encouraging faculties to allocate 
more time to education related activities as well as more efficient management within every 
single ‘public’ university. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. The case of higher education in Greece: A textbook monopoly to reform 
 
2.1 Professors against taxpayers  
 
In this section we argue that there are a number of members of the Greek educational community 
that act as monopoly providers of higher education services. It is assumed that there is no 
mechanism that permits the whole society, which includes not only the service providers but also 
the service consumers, to decide on the question if this monopoly should be perpetuated. Such a 
mechanism could be a referendum, but members of the service consuming community- students 
and their parents- are assumed not to be organized or adequately informed (they are assumed to 
be turkeys that do not vote for thanksgiving), and thus are unable to promote the implementation 
of such a mechanism.  
 
On the other hand members of the service providing community are supposed to be well informed 
and organized. As a result, they are assumed to have established a social decision rule that allows 
the members of this group to collectively decide on the extent to which the provision of these 
services remains a monopoly. Members of the education service providing group can also 
individually decide how much of their time to allocate individually to extract personally some of 
these rents and how much time to allocate to activities that are related to their role as members of 
the education providing community, like research, teaching, preparing classes and projects and 
tutoring students. 
 
According to the discussion in Rodrik (1996), it can be justified that one group is better organized 
as it is the interest group that stands to incur a significant and immediate cost, related to the loss 
of rent, by any proposed reform. The organization of this group may finally be facilitated, or at 
least tolerated, by policymakers that control the government apparatus and who act as brokers for 
the rent that the service providing community receive, as described in Kimenyi and Mbaka (1993) 
and in Drazen (2000). The lack of a mechanism like a broad referendum that internalizes the 
opinion of those that stand to win from reform may not necessarily imply that it is not technically 
available; it may also imply that the interested groups do not proceed to use it, or promote it's use, 
because they do perceive their benefits from using it as too uncertain, or not large enough at an 
immediate date. The "winners of reform" in our case are students that receive better education, 
and their parents that will see their children mature with the benefits of a quality education, a 
process that may take years or even decades to become evident to both child and parent and as a 
result such issues may indeed be very relevant in their case. The issues of the uncertainty of the 
benefits from reform and the speed at which they become available to the concerned interest 
groups are discussed in Rodrik (1996) and issues of uncertainty are discussed in work like 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and the literature that expands on their contribution, as well as the 
books of Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Drazen (2000). Finally, as Rodrik (1996) quotes 
suggestions from Sachs (1994), it may be that the groups that stand to benefit from liberalization, 
parents and students in our case, simply lack the common sense to understand what is in their 
interest, till the moment liberalization is introduced at which point they will see the obvious. But 
it should also be taken into account that reform proposals so far seem not to have taken into 
account the necessarily political economy considerations, as suggested by Kim and Pirttila (2003) 
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and Rodrik (1996) among others, that need to address the balance of positive impacts to short 
term negative impacts in order to built a momentum for sustainable reform. Following also the 
categorization of Drazen (2000), we have therefore both a powerful interest group that blocks 
reform because reform is against its individual interest, as also described by Olson (1982), and in 
addition the group of the beneficiaries of reform is much more numerous, giving, from their 
respective, the benefits from reform a public goods nature.  
  
We make reasonable assumptions on the technologies that are available to each individual 
member of the education service providing community. It is assumed that when more time is 
allocated by the individual towards education related activities, the individual will receive larger 
payoffs from the provision of these services and a smaller amount of monopoly rents. 
Furthermore we assume that when the educational community as a whole favors education related 
activities then the individual providers of educational services are remunerated more generously 
for any given time they allocate towards these activities, that is there are positive spillovers. We 
assume that in this case an individual providing these services will receive higher remuneration 
for its effort, as when the whole educational community focuses on the production of education 
related services it manages to secure larger funding by the provision of these services as a whole 
to society to compensate more generously the individual. Of course this general assumption 
implies an efficient management of the educational system, the detailed description of which 
exceeds the scope of the current paper. But in itself the assumption that when the whole 
educational community focuses on education related activities the individual effort allocated to 
these activities will be rewarded better is sound, and assuming the contrary, on a generalized 
basis, would be counterintuitive. 
 
Regarding the assumption that the individual can extract rents from the monopolistic provision of 
educational services, this assumption presupposes the ability of the educational community to 
impose a monopoly that enables subsequently the individual extraction of a share of the relevant 
rents. We suppose that the collective decision of the education providers’ community can ensure 
such rents. This can happen by ruling out alternative providers to the members of the existing 
educational community. With the increase of the monopoly power the society is increasingly 
forced to turn to the sole provider, the group of established educational services providers, to 
satisfy its demand for these services. Again there are assumed positive spillovers. When the 
educational community as a whole favors rent extraction, any individual will find the allocation 
of time towards rent extracting activities more rewarding.  
 
In our case the assumption is that these rents accrue from the ability of the educational 
community to block the entry of competition in the education services provision industry. Thus 
the introduction of a decision making mechanism that will permit the society as whole to 
eliminate the ability of the existing educational community to affect the decision on permitting 
the entry of competitors in the market will be an equivalent to a change in the parameters of the 
rent extracting/protecting technology and as such will significantly alter the decision of the 
existing educational community as a whole, but also of each member individually. In particular, 
we argue that they will allocate more time towards education related activities and furthermore 
vote for the community to favor such activities more than it does under the existing monopoly, 
which suggests that in spite of the current resistance to change the implementation of change will 
ultimately be accepted by the educational community. And if there are large enough externalities, 
such a shift may as well provoke a move from a ‘greatest lower bound to a least upper bound’ in 
which education related activities are favored. Such a process could create further support for 
reform after it's introduction, addressing thus issues raised in the literature, as in Rodrik (1996) 
and Kim and Pirttila (2003) for example, that suggest that if the intermediate benefits of reform 




2.2. A piece of evidence 
 
Data that is available from OECD on the spending on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP 
and certain measures of performance show that in Greece measures of quality are low, even when 
accounting for low spending on education. This seems to be true both in secondary as well as for 
tertiary education. Thus, 
 
1. Given the expenditure on tertiary education as a percentage of GDP, there are now and 
average number of students at age 29 (figure 1), a number that has increased significantly 
in the past 5 years, and which may be related to the introduction of for-pay graduate 
programs in public universities.  
2. There is, for the given expenditure always, a very high number of 21 year-old students 
while, as we have already seen, at the same time there is an average number of students 
attending tertiary education at a higher age (figure 2).  
3. The tertiary education programs attended by so many students at the entry level of higher 
education is affecting the student to teaching staff ratio that is the least favorable 
observed not only in perspective of the amount spent on tertiary education, but also by 
any absolute measure (figure 3). 
4. Many of the young students that attend the tertiary programs are especially unsuccessful 
in their bid to secure employment, as the low percentage of employed graduates shows 
(figure 4). This indicator, we note, is not affected by the participation of graduates in the 
labor market, in the same way, as any unemployment rate would be. That is students that 
do not participate in the labor market because they have completely given up on the hope 
of finding a job and are not registered as unemployed do appear in our statistic while if 
instead we were looking at the unemployment rate they would not appear to the extent 
that they do not register as unemployed. Psacharopoulos (2004), citing Eurostat, points 
out that Greece has indeed the highest unemployment among tertiary education graduates 
under 24, that stands at 28.8%, relative to 12.8% for the EU as a whole.   
5. OECD data shows that an exceptionally high percentage of Greek students seeks higher 
education abroad, with only Ireland having a comparable percentage because a large 
number of its students attend English universities, in spite of the fact that the cost of the 
provision of tertiary education is already included in the bill of taxpayers and the cost of 
studying abroad is significant (figure 5). Psacharopoulos (2004) estimates that this cost is 
about 10% of the foreign exchange Greece receives from tourism, or 0.5% of the GDP. 
Psacharopoulos and Papakonstantiou (2005) provide data that confirms that students and 
their families spend privately more than the state not only in order to prepare for the 
entrance examinations but also while attending at the university. In private non-
recognized officially as tertiary institution, ‘colleges’ as well as in cram schools 
(‘frontisteria’) located sometimes next to universities, professors are recruited to teach 
classes although the law does not permit this.    
6. Finally, given the spending on public tertiary education, of which by law the state is the 
sole monopolistic provider, the output in publications in sciences and arts is very low 
(figure 6). As Psacharopoulos (2004) argues, it is not surprising that Greece lags behind 
in academic output as the civil servant tenure for life status allows professors to escape 
academic competition. It follows that in fact, tenured professors behave as a monopoly 
protected interest group allocating most of their time either protecting their monopoly 
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Percentage of tertiary education students that attend programs abroad. OECD,
Education at a Glance 2002.
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In sum, for the given expenditure on higher education as a percentage of GDP compared to other 
OECD countries, publications in arts and sciences and attendance of tertiary programs at the age 
of 29 are not favorable. And although there is very high attendance in tertiary programs at a low 
age, there is ample evidence that the education received by those many students is of very low 
quality, indeed mismatching market needs. Thus, it seems that these tertiary programs lack 
coherence, as measures of quality like the student to instructor ratio are very unfavorable. Also 
the data documents an unreasonable inability of graduates to find employment, which also points 
to serious qualitative insufficiencies. Finally, the exceptionally high percentage of tertiary 
education attendants that choose to migrate abroad also reveals the judgment of the attendants of 
tertiary education that the services provided by the Greek universities are of sufficiently low 
quality for them to seek education abroad, in spite of the extremely high cost such a decision 
entails, a cost that is added to the tax that the interested groups have already paid for the 
maintenance of Greek state universities, since no deduction or voucher is offered to those that opt 
out of the state monopoly.  
 
All the above pieces of evidence are directly compatible with the assertion of a low quality of the 
education services supplied for a given price by the monopoly provider. This low quality, we 
stress, is documented not by an absolute measure of educational performance but from measures 
of quantitative and qualitative performance given the amount of expenditure, as a percentage of 
GDP and in comparison to the relative performance of other OECD countries that with similar 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP seem to manage obviously better results, as in all qualitative 
measures enrolment Greece appears either on or near the inefficiency frontier.  
 
 
2.3. Rent seeking Professors: Fatigue and overworked? 
 
Monopoly providers in higher education both in Greece and in most of the continental EU 
member states, although they steadily resist reform proposals for opening the system to 
competition through the establishment of non-governmental institutions, used to attribute poor 
quality and mismanagement to reasons such as ‘fatigue’ or underfunding, emphasizing 
overcrowded classes and insufficient government spending (Perotti 2002). Most of the times, they 
also accuse politicians for pork-barrel politics in higher education as new departments and 
universities of poor quality are founded by the state mainly in rural peripheries with the purpose 
to satisfy local demands as well as to increase national students’ accession rates. They refer 
specifically to politicians who use their rent-creating power through founding new departments, 
in order to maximize in return voting gains both locally and nationally.   
 
As a matter of fact, as figure 3 above shows, Greece is not among the big spenders in tertiary 
education and its 27/1 ratio of students to teaching staff is the worst among OECD countries. As 
argued, ‘fatigue’ then comes up as an explanation, as Professors seem being too busy and 
overworked, classes appear overcrowded and students too many and demanding. However, as 
Perotti (2002) correctly emphasizes, what matters for the teaching load is the number of Full 
Time Equivalent (FTE) students and not the head count of students. It seems, at first glance, that 
funding from the Greek government is insufficient, actually around $ 4157 per student 
expenditure, $ US – PPS against 9063 average in the EU- (OECD 2001). But the system allows 
students to get enrolled without an exit deadline, and so relatively few of them are usually 
attending courses. It is estimated that only ¾ of students are ‘active’ and in fact, only 30% of 
them do attend classes. As a consequence, the ratio of students to teaching staff is much lower 
than the official 27/1, and, as a consequence, universities may well be funded than it initially 
appears as far as attending students is concerned.  
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Questions to under funding may relate to salaries, which are fixed by the levels of civil servant 
salaries and paid for by the Ministry of Education (and not the universities) or operational costs, 
which are also always paid regardless if their height is reasonable or not. But the fact that the 
performance of Greek universities is low even when adjusting for the level of funding, in addition 
to the abovementioned considerations, suggests that other parameters are also important in 
shaping the outcome observed.   
 
Given the rigid pay structure of the civil servants, that is applied to university teaching staff in 
Greece, the rationale examined in Posner (1993) for judges may indeed apply also in this case. If 
that is the case, university teaching staff and professors should care about keeping control of time 
allocation so they can protect and hide rents as well as choose to enjoy leisure or engage in 
moonlighting (seek additional money elsewhere), leaving the inferior, non-tenured staff to do the 
teaching and any other administrative jobs. Perotti (2002) describes indeed very well the 
discrimination against the non-tenured staff. The unfair, anti-academic and exploitative way that 
many tenured, full professors usually treat the non-tenured staff. He also presents data that shows 
that in most of the times, the so-called candidates or ‘outsiders’ in Italy have in the average more 
publications in international refereed journals than commissioners (‘insiders’, tenured 
Professors). Buchanan and Devletoglou (1970) on the same lines, confirm that this type of closed 
systems allows a discriminating treatment that favors certain established groups to extract and 
protect rents at the expense of the most qualified academics.        
 
Inevitably, since the perpetuation of the monopoly requires the support of lawmakers, politicians, 
who act to maximize support from the voters, are also involved in a way also outlined in Drazen 
(2000). In the case of Greece, as free higher education provision substitutes for monopoly 
providers (faculties), politicians invest, by transferring taxpayers’ money, in power, well-
organized groups, such as the tenured teaching staff and administrators with fixed contracts and 
permanent for-life jobs. It should not be underestimated that as ‘men of letters’, Professors in 
particular retain a heavy influence on public opinion, an asset that they used to sell to politicians 
in order to keep their present academic status quo intact. In this context, and with limited or 
asymmetric information -as cost of receiving information is very high-, to the public; in fact, 
politicians tend to ‘mitigate’ any opposition/reform voices within higher education (young 
professors, students-consumers and student’s families). Thus, very few talk to the public about 
the merits of academic emulation or about tertiary education’s status quo inefficiency, corruption 
and mismanagement. As education remains ‘state provided’, politicians as utility-maximizers, 
allocate taxpayers’ money to bribe and gain power groups’ support, by buying academic votes 
and influence over society in particular. Thus, the status quo prevails and the public remains 
uninformed as far as the merits of academic competition and deregulation is concerned.  
 
Consequently, faculties defending the established time allocation settings, in most of the times, 
share the same interests with political entrepreneurs who rationally -at least in short term- protect 
the rigid, monopoly provision in higher education. The present tenure system that lies at the root 
of academic conservatism, gives faculties full power to succeed in defending their rents realized 
by existing time-allocation and keep academic life as quiet and ‘convenient’ as possible so they 
are free of constraints to maximize their interests and set of priorities (Raines and Leathers, 
2003). As a consequence, and as our model confirmed, they do allocate time to defend monopoly 
provision at the expense both of academic quality and consumers’ (students) and taxpayers’ 
preferences.  
 
Unfortunately, groups as university faculties, accustomed to a rent, used to fight much more 
vigorously against its removal than they do for its introduction (Mueller, 2003). If, thus, rent 
dissipation is so wasteful in that case, then there is an additional reason for a reformist, forward 
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looking politician to urgently implement appropriate measures to fight so much inefficiency, 
social waste and unfairness in higher education. 
 
 
3. Policy implications 
 
We have argued that education providers that are operating in an environment that secures 
monopoly rents will rationally allocate effort to secure these rents and rationally choose to 
perpetuate the existence of this monopoly. These efforts will come at the expense of the effort 
they allocate to the provision of education related activities.  
 
We also argued that the abolition of the said monopoly, in spite of the objections currently raised 
by members of the educational community, will result in the members of the educational 
community spending less time towards rent extraction/protection and more time towards 
educational activities, something that should benefit the consumers of these services. At the same 
time while the structural intervention will refocus the whole community towards educational 
activities and lead to the reduction of monopolistic rents extracted by the providers of these 
services, their rents from the provision of the services they are expected to provide will increase 
and compensate, at least partly, for their loss.  
 
We presented statistical evidence that suggests that the existence of the state monopoly in Greece 
is associated with the provision of low quality and quantity services for a given price, something 
that standard economic theory suggests is compatible with the existence of rents that accrue to the 
monopolistic provider at the expense of the consumer. A first policy suggestion would therefore 
be for the government that is funding with taxpayers money the cost of operating the 
monopolistic universities, to collect and widely publicize performance indicators. Since rent-
protecting faculties usually present their activities as productive and socially beneficial, denying 
that their gains are privileged rents from rent seeking and rent protection activities (Hillman 
2003), further research is needed in order to reveal the secret violations of efficiency by the 
monopoly providers.  
 
As part of a reform agenda, voting blocks of students-consumers and taxpayers have to become 
organized and information has to be expanded to them in order to keep them abreast of the 
welfare reduction they suffer under the current system and that it is for them cost effective to 
resist and address the efficiency of the system (Rodrik, 1989; Tollison, 1997). Such measures also 
assist to neutralize the expenditures of the monopoly providers to defend the status quo. Such an 
effort will have to address the fact that the students/consumers and taxpayers are the classic 
examples of large ‘Olsonian groups’ facing ‘free riding’ in organizing. The publication of the 
facts has to be done in a way that will take into account the fact that such groups tend to be very 
diverse, lack coherence and power and, hence, do not strongly perceive the incentive to initiate 
actions on their own to express preferences and defend rights to exercise some control over the 
quantity, quality and differentiation of the academic services received. Thus policy has to 
contribute some guide to the system, as suggested by Raines and Leathers (2003).  
 
Since average politicians care to a great extent to elect, or re-elect, themselves and given that 
taxpayers’ and students’/consumers’ votes outnumber those of faculties, even when we include 
Professor’s influence to the public, a policy initiative that informs taxpayers and consumers about 
their losses and in particular that structures incentives for them to organize themselves, exert 
influence over education issues and claim to impose their preferences should actually help the 
initiating politicians to gain votes and support from the vast groups of people gaining from 
deregulation.      
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Another step, to be taken at the same time, is to make funding to universities conditional on the 
performance indicators, as suggested in Belfield (2003). But in order to make the evaluation and 
assessment of universities’ performance meaningful, greater freedom in the provision of 
education by each university is needed. Today, the complicated and non-transparent rules that 
allocate resources provided by the taxpayer to the universities that give faculties a motive to 
divert their time away from teaching and research are paired with equally complicated and non-
transparent rules that determine the way education services are provided. Making funding 
conditional on performance indicators when universities are unable to shape their academic 
programs freely will result them being evaluated for performance which is not the result of their 
decisions and merits. Concerning this policy suggestion, Perotti (2002) suggests that as a result a 
public market would be created and a meaningful competition between individuals and 
universities would begin, weakening the rents extraction opportunities that the current system 
seems to offer. Hillman (2003) also suggests that as a consequence of this policy in favor of 
‘public markets’, operational costs and red tape are expected to shrink, and the system will start to 
behave in a more efficient way, as universities would begin to face pressures for high quality 
teaching, research and publish and compete for students-consumers and the associated revenues 
by producing institutional prestige. At the same time, like also suggests our argument, faculties 
will start to realize that their rent-protecting opportunity does not yield the highest personal return 
and start to feel pressures for alternative use of time and resources towards purely academic 
activities.It is reasonable to assume that along with the development of such a ‘public market’ the 
presently observed mismatch between tertiary education output and labor market demands will 
also begin to diminish as the forces of academic competition will adapt academic programs to the 
needs of the job market in an effort to make these programs more attractive to prospective 
students through an increased probability of find an attractive job placement after graduation.  
 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
Building on a growing literature that examines the economic behavior of rent seeking, we applied 
this behavior to the Greek higher education. We argued that once reform is implemented, faculty 
members that now fiercely resist reform would start allocating their time on teaching and research 
rather than rent protection and seeking as they do today. Thus, once reform is introduced, those 
that now fiercely resist it will, rationally, accept the new status quo and adapt to it. This 
prediction becomes relevant as the data that is available indicated that the market of tertiary 
education in Greece shows clearly the textbook symptoms of a monopoly in which the monopoly 
power of the provider is indeed exercised to the detriment of the consumer, that is low quantity 
(or quantifiable quality) for a relatively high price. Thus there seem to be significant gains to be 
made by the consumer of the services, gains that remain unrealized under the current system 
because society yields to the fierce resistance to reform in which the rent beneficiaries engage. 
 
The proposed avenue of reform, the literature suggests, should include as first steps gathering 
information to expose the existing rents and use this information to inform the public about the 
welfare loss it suffers. In this context, it is clear that further research is needed in order to reveal 
and measure the secret violations of efficiency by the monopoly providers. At the same time, it 
is of cardinal importance to use the expected welfare gains for the education service consumers as 
the support for the politicians that will promote the necessary reforms to expand. Reforms need 
also to include both the increase of the freedom of universities to shape their academic programs 
and the linking of the government funding they receive with measures of academic performance 
that will allow the meaningful comparison of the performance of the different universities and 
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